Former Nigerian Head of State Yakubu Gowon has reopened contentious debates over the causes of the 1967–1970 Nigerian Civil War, claiming in his new autobiography that the late Biafran leader, Chukwuemeka Odumegwu Ojukwu, deliberately frustrated repeated attempts to prevent the conflict.
In *My Life of Service and Allegiance*, Gowon offers a detailed personal account of the political mistrust, constitutional crises, and failed negotiations that plunged the country into war following the 1966 military coups and subsequent ethnic violence.
“Ojukwu deliberately and effectively thwarted every effort we made to amicably resolve our national issues,” Gowon wrote.
The former military leader recounted how the federal government pursued political settlements amid widespread outrage in the Eastern Region over the killings of Igbos in parts of Northern Nigeria, which fueled separatist sentiments. He said the federal side approached the landmark January 1967 Aburi meeting in Ghana with genuine hopes of reconciliation.
“We went to Aburi with open minds and with the sincere hope of finding a basis for national reconciliation,” Gowon stated. The talks, mediated by then-Ghanaian leader Lt.-Gen. Joseph Arthur Ankrah, brought together Nigeria’s senior military officers at a time of deep ethnic and institutional strain.
However, according to Gowon, the accord collapsed when the two sides returned with sharply divergent interpretations of the agreements reached. He argued that Ojukwu’s version of the Aburi Accord would have dangerously weakened federal authority and threatened the survival of Nigeria as a united nation.
“What was presented by Ojukwu as the Aburi Accord was, in reality, his own interpretation of our discussions,” Gowon wrote.
Despite the impasse, Gowon maintained that the federal military government continued efforts to avoid war. “At every stage, we tried to preserve Nigeria without resorting to war,” he emphasised.
The autobiography revisits long-standing controversies surrounding the Aburi Accord, rejecting accusations that the federal government negotiated in bad faith. Gowon described the period as one dominated by fear, suspicion, and eroding trust among leaders.
“Ojukwu’s actions made peaceful settlement increasingly difficult,” he wrote, adding that communication between both sides deteriorated rapidly in the lead-up to Biafra’s declaration of independence on May 30, 1967. “We were confronted with a situation in which compromise was becoming almost impossible.”
Gowon also defended the federal decision to create 12 states shortly before the declaration, saying it was intended to address the concerns of minority ethnic groups in the old Eastern Region who feared domination. “The creation of states was intended to give all groups a sense of belonging within Nigeria,” he explained.
He insisted that the federal government did not seek military confrontation. “Ojukwu’s declaration of Biafra left the federal government with no choice,” Gowon wrote.
Reflecting on the war’s end in January 1970, the former leader defended the “No Victor, No Vanquished” policy, which aimed at reconciliation and reintegration. “We fought to keep Nigeria one, not to destroy a people,” he stated. He acknowledged the deep trauma caused by the massacres of 1966, saying he understood Eastern fears but could not accept the breakup of the country.
Gowon’s memoir presents a perspective that places primary responsibility for the collapse of peace efforts on Ojukwu, contrasting with the late Biafran leader’s own narrative that Biafra was born out of necessity due to the Nigerian state’s failure to protect its citizens.
“We exhausted every peaceful avenue available to us. But Nigeria had to survive,” Gowon concluded.
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